Critical Edition of John of Reading

John of Reading was an English Scotist, who defended the master against Ockham and Auriol. He lectured on the Sentences at Oxford around 1320, and was lector at the Franciscan studium at Avignon until he died in 1346.  Francesco Fiorentino has begun a critical edition of his massive commentary, which despite its length doesn't even make it as far as d.8 of book I.

The first volume is available from J. Vrin:

Jean de Reading

Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum

Vrin, « Textes philosophiques du Moyen-Age ». 384 p., 16 × 24 cm. ISBN : 978-2-7116-2310-5

Ce livre donne un point de vue nouveau sur l’histoire de la pensée au XIVe siècle, grâce aux questions 1 à 5 – jusqu’alors inédites – du Prologue du commentaire de Jean de Reading aux Sentences de Pierre Lombard. L’édition est précédée d’une introduction, qui retrace la vie et les œuvres de Reading, précise la datation, la nature et la structure du commentaire, la liste des questions, les critères d’édition, ainsi que les sources. Elle résume aussi le contenu des questions éditées.
Jean de Reading, théologien franciscain actif à Oxford et à Avignon autour du 1320, est bachelier sous Guillaume d’Alnwick et socius de Guillaume d’Ockham. Il dialogue avec Jean Duns Scot, Guillaume de Nottingham, Robert de Cowton, Richard de Conington, Pierre d’Auriol, Hervé de Nedellec et Durand de Saint-Pourçain.
Dans les questions qui sont ici éditées, Jean de Reading expose sa conception de la méthode en théologie, du sujet et de l’unité d’une science, de la distinction entre sciences. Il participe pleinement, à la hauteur d’Ockham, à l’histoire générale des théories de la méthode scientifique.

Édition, introduction et notes par Francesco Fiorentino

Petrus Thomae on Intrinsic Modes

This is a follow-up to the post on the pseudo-Francis.  Here I will give (in translation) a series of 12 propositions and six corollaries that Peter Thomae gives in his Quaestiones de modis distinctionum.  This work was written in the late 1320's at Barcelona, and is devoted to teasing out the meaning of the various kinds of distinctions in use among the scholastics, as well as defending Scotus from the first generation of critics (such as Hervaeus Natalis, Gerardus Boloniensis, and Peter Auriol). Note that I give only the statement of the proposition, not the defense of it. In the last corollary Peter attacks Francis of Mayronis' definition of an intrinsic mode, which was accurately reported by the pseudo-Francis, to wit, an intrinsic mode is that which supervenes on a quiddity without changing its formal definition.

Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de modis distinctionum, q. 11 a. 1 (cf. Naples, BN, Ms. VIII.F.17, f. 83vb-84ra):

Propositions:

1. An intrinsic mode is in itself in the thing from the nature of the thing (mous intrinsecus est in se in re ex natura rei).

2. An intrinsic mode is not formally a second intention.

3. An intrinsic mode is not formally  a quiddity of a thing or part of a quiddity, for if so, therefore every quiddity would be a mode or composed from modes, which is not fitting.

4. An intrinsic mode is not formally a reality, for there is some reality which is not an intrinsic mode, therefore etc.

5. An intrinsic mode is properly in respect to a formality, for a thing is that which it is by means of a formality.

6. An intrinsic mode is not formally a negation, since no negation is intrinsic to something positive; but an intrinsic mode is intrinsic to the thing of which it is the mode; therefore etc.

7. An intrinsic mode is not formally something relative nor something absolute.

8. An intrinsic mode is formally not a grade of intention or remission, because if it were, only that which admits of intension would have an intrinsic mode, which is false.

9. An intrinsic mode is not formally a quantity or magnitude of power as some say.

10. An intrinsic mode does not formally limit something to a certain genus.

11. An intrinsic mode is transcendent [i.e. super-categorical]

12. An intrinsic mode of a thing is a certain positive and transcendent ratio which neither is a quiddity nor part of a quiddity (all these conditions can be elicited from the previous propositions).

Corollaries:

1. An intrinsic mode of a thing has a proper concept.

2. A proper concept of an intrinsic mode is not quidditative but modificative.

3. The ratio of a difference cannot be taken from an intrinsic mode.

4. An intrinsic mode is inseparable in actual existence from the thing of which it is, for it exists things intrinsically, and according to its intimacy [intimitatem], on account of which is impossible that the intrinsic mode be separated from the thing of which it is in actual existence.

5. The statement of the ones saying that an intrinsic mode is that which does not have a precise concept from that of which it is is not true, since indeed it has a proper concept according to which it can be conceived without the thing of which it is a mode being conceived.

6. The statement of those saying that an intrinsic mode is that which supervening on something does not change its formal ratio is not true. For an intrinsic mode is not of the thing of which it is supervening, rather it is prevening, at least by the mode of conceiving, since it has a contracted ratio.  Second, because if it did, then that mode would not be intrinsic but accidental, and so there would be an intrinsic mode of that, which is false, etc.

What are Intrinsic Modes?

Instrinsic modes are another of Duns Scotus' controversial contributions to philosophy, and are perhaps as obscure a feature as one can find in his system.  For Scotus these modes operate sort of like differences, in the Porphyrian sense of the term (Porphyry's differences contract a genus into species, Scotus' modes separate different degrees of intensity). I will save further discussion of Scotus' idea of intrinsic modes for a later post.  In this post I am giving a handy summary from the pseudo-Franciscus de Mayronis' Tractatus Formalitatum.  This treatise has long been known to be by pseudo-Francis; generally, medieval thinkers don't mention themselves by name in their own works, as does this tractate.  It is also described as being 'ad mentem Francisci', another clue.  This treatise is distinct from the genuine Formalitates of Francis, which appears to be an extract from his Conflatus. Not to give away too much from a certain forthcoming article, but the theory of distinction found in this treatise is not even Francis', who holds to a four-fold division of identity and distinction, but that of Petrus Thomae (seven kinds of identity and corresponding distinction).  I have some fantasies ('theories' would imply there was some facts at work) about how this fusion took place, but I'll keep them to myself. Pseudo-Francis' description of an intrinsic mode is that which advenes on a quiddity or forme without altering the definition. He thinks that there are nine kinds of modes, and given what these are, it is clear that multiple modes can befall the same quiddity.

pseudo-Franciscus de Mayronis, Tractatus formalitatum, a.2 (ed. Venezia 1520, f. 263vb):

Quantum ad primum punctum, videlicet quid sit modus intrinsecus, dico talem conclusionem affirmativam: 'modus intrinsecus est ille que adveniens alicui forme seu quidditati non variat eius formalem rationem'. Verbi gratia: signetur albedo, tunc certum est quod aliqius modus competit secundum magis et aliquis secundum minus. Dato quod Sorti competat albedo ut trium graduum, Plato ut quatuor, ibi esset diversa participatio albedinis; non tamen esset variatio in ista ratione formali, quoniam Sortes est vere albus et Plato est vere albus, licet Plato albior sit Sorte.

Hanc etiam conclusionem probo sic: nullum posterius potest variare esse sui prioris; sed modus intrinsecus est posterior eo cuius est modus, scilicet quidditate; igitur modus intrinsecus non potest variare esse sui prioris. Consequentia tenet. Maior nota et minor patet, quia modus est adiecens rei determinatio.

[...]

Quantum ad secundum punctum sciendum quod novem sunt genera modorum intrinsecorum, videlicet finitum et infinitum, actus et potentia, necessarium et contingens, existentia, realitas et hecceitas...

Translation:

As far as the first point is concerned, namely what is an intrinsic mode, I give an affirmative proposition: 'an intrinsic mode is that which supervening on some form or quiddity does not alter the formal definition of that form or quiddity'. For example, let whiteness be designated/signified[?]. Then it is certain that some mode befalls it according to more and some mode which befalls it less. For with it given that whiteness befalls Socrates in the third grade, Plato in the fourth, there would be there diverse participations of whiteness; nevertheless there would not be any variation in its formal definition, since Socrates is truly white, although Plato is whiter than Socrates.

I also prove this conclusion thus: nothing posterior can alter the the being of its prior; but an intrinsic mode is posterior to that of which it is a mode, namely a quiddity; therefore an intrinsic mode is not able to alter the being of its prior.  The consequence holds. The major [premise] is known, the minor is clear because a mode is an adjacent determination of a thing.

[...]

According to the second point it should be known that there are nine genera of intrinsic modes, namely finite and infinite, act and potency, necessary and contingent, existence, reality and haecceity.