Here'a quote I ran across from the spanish Scotist theologian Petrus de Atarrabia, on our ability to cognize substances. If those of you who went to the St. Bonaventure should recall from Pini's paper, Scotus himself holds that substance is not directly accessible to our intellect in this life. As is common with Scotus, he goes through various developmental stages. In the end, while he does not think we can know substances immediately, we can infer their existence from the existence of accidents. Being is univocal between them. Ultimately, we probably can't know much about the natures that constitute things in the world either, if all we know is accidents. In class today, Richard suggested that one of the underlying motivations for this position is that Aristotle thinks that cognition has qualities, items in the category of quality, as its object. Note the presence of the Eucharist in the second argument; this was a standard trope in this problem in the late thirteenth-century as well, possibly introduced by Richard of Middleton and also considered by Scotus. I have another quote somewhere by Alexander Bonini of Alessandria that is similar in content which I may post later. The context of the quote is Peter's discussion of univocity. He gives several arguments largely drawn from Scotus though with modifications. This is the end of his second argument. This particular section is followed by one comparing Scotus and Thomas and seeing if they agree.
Peter of Navarre, I Sent. d. 3 pars 1 q. 1
n.14: The second consequence is proved, concerning the cognition of substance: Substance does not immediately move the possible intellect naturally in the wayfaring state; therefore accidents move it immediately, since there is nothing other which can move it. Then, as before: accidents do not include substance either virtually or essentially according to their proper concept [rationem], or according to their common concept, ex hypothesi; therefore they can not cause the knowledge of substance because they can not cause a more perfect concept than their own quidditative one, or of that which it includes, nor can an imperfect concept cause a more perfect one.
n.15. That substance cannot move the possible intellect immediately is proved so: when something immediately moves a cognitive power to cognition of itself, and the power perceives its presence when it is present and absence when it is absent; but our cognitive power cannot perceive the presence of substance when it is present; therefore substance does not immediately move our cognitive power. The minor is proved: it is certain by faith that the substance of Christ is present in the consecrated host, and nevertheless no intellect conjoined can naturally perceive the presence of it there.
